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Abstract 
 
In the early 1940s, Haavelmo proposed a probabilistic structure for econometric modeling, aiming to make 
econometrics useful for decision making. His fundamental contribution has become thoroughly embedded 
in subsequent econometric research, yet it could not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. 
Notably, Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models can 
at most approximate actuality. In the same period, Wald initiated his own seminal development of statistical 
decision theory. Haavelmo favorably cited Wald, but econometrics did not embrace statistical decision 
theory. Instead, it focused on study of identification, estimation, and statistical inference. This paper 
proposes statistical decision theory as a framework for evaluation of the performance of models in decision 
making. I particularly consider the common practice of as-if optimization: specification of a model, point 
estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the 
estimate were accurate. A central theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-
based decision rule by its performance across the state space listing all states of nature that one believes 
feasible, not the model space. I apply the theme to prediction and treatment choice. Statistical decision 
theory is conceptually simple, but application is often challenging. Advancement of computation is the 
primary task to continue building the foundations sketched by Haavelmo and Wald. 
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1. Introduction: Joining Haavelmo and Wald 
 
 Early in the modern development of econometrics, Trygve Haavelmo compared astronomy and 
planning to differentiate two objectives for modeling: to advance science and to inform decision making. 
He wrote (Haavelmo, 1943, p. 10): 
“The economist may have two different purposes in mind when he constructs a model . . . . First, 
he may consider himself in the same position as an astronomer; he cannot interfere with the actual 
course of events. So he sets up the system . . . . as a tentative description of the economy. If he finds 
that it fits the past, he hopes that it will fit the future. On that basis he wants to make predictions, 
assuming that no one will interfere with the game. Next, he may consider himself as having the 
power to change certain aspects of the economy in the future. If then the system . . . . has worked 
in the past, he may be interested in knowing it as an aid in judging the effect of his intended future 
planning, because he thinks that certain elements of the old system will remain invariant.” 
Jacob Marschak, supporting Haavelmo’s work, made a related distinction between meteorological and 
engineering types of inference; see Bjerkholt (2010) and Marschak and Andrews (1944). 
 Comparing astronomy and planning provides a nice metaphor for two branches of econometrics. In 
1943, before space flight, an astronomer might model a solar system to advance physical science, but the 
effort could have no practical impact on decision making. An economist might similarly model an economy 
to advance social science. However, an economist might also model to inform society about the 
consequences of contemplated decisions that would change aspects of the economy. 
 Haavelmo’s doctoral thesis (Haavelmo, 1944) proposed a probabilistic structure for econometrics that 
aimed to make it useful for public decision making. To conclude, he wrote (p. 114-115): 
“In other quantitative sciences the discovery of “laws,” even in highly specialized fields, has moved 
from the private study into huge scientific laboratories where scores of experts are engaged, not 
only in carrying out actual measurements, but also in working out, with painstaking precision, the 
formulae to be tested and the plans for crucial experiments to be made. Should we expect less in 
economic research, if its results are to be the basis for economic policy upon which might depend 
billions of dollars of national income and the general economic welfare of millions of people?” 
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Haavelmo’s thesis made fundamental contributions that became thoroughly embedded in econometrics.  
Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that it did not fully answer all the deep issues that the author raised. Notably, 
Haavelmo struggled to formalize the implications for decision making of the fact that models only 
approximate actuality. He called attention to this in his opening chapters on “Abstract Models and Reality” 
and “The Degree of Permanence of Economic Laws,” but the later chapters did not resolve the matter. 
 Haavelmo devoted a chapter to “The Testing of Hypotheses,” expositing the then recent work of 
Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933) and considering its potential use to evaluate the consistency of models 
with observed data. Testing models subsequently became widespread, both as a topic of study in 
econometric theory and as a practice in empirical research. However, Neyman-Pearson testing does not 
provide satisfactory guidance for decision making.  See Section 2.3 below. 
 While Haavelmo was writing his thesis, Abraham Wald was initiating his own seminal development 
of statistical decision theory in Wald (1939, 1945) and elsewhere, which culminated in his treatise (Wald, 
1950). Wald’s work has broad potential application. Indeed, it implicitly provides an appealing framework 
for evaluation of the use of models in decision making. I say that Wald “implicitly” provides this framework 
because, writing abstractly, he appears not to have explicitly examined decision making with models. Yet 
it is straightforward to use statistical decision theory this way. Explaining this motivates the present paper. 
 I find it intriguing to join the contributions of Haavelmo and Wald because they interacted to a 
considerable degree in the United States during the wartime period when both were developing their ideas. 
Wald came to the U.S. in 1938 as a refugee from Austria. Haavelmo arrived in 1939 for what was intended 
to be a short visit, but which lasted the entire war when he could not return to occupied Norway. Bjerkholt 
(2007, 2015), in biographical essays on Haavelmo’s period in the United States, describes the many 
interactions of Haavelmo and Wald, not only at professional conferences but also in hiking expeditions.  
 Haavelmo’s appreciation of Wald is clear. In the preface of Haavelmo (1944), he wrote (p. v): 
“My most sincere thanks are due to Professor Abraham Wald of Columbia University for numerous 
suggestions and for help on many points in preparing the manuscript. Upon his unique knowledge 
of modern statistical theory and mathematics in general I have drawn very heavily. Many of the 
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statistical sections in this study have been formulated, and others have been reformulated, after 
discussions with him.” 
The text of the thesis cites several of Wald’s papers. Most relevant is the final chapter on “Problems of 
Prediction,” where Haavelmo suggests application of the framework in Wald (1939) to choose a predictor 
of a random outcome. I discuss this in Section 4.1 below. 
 Despite Haavelmo’s favorable citations of Wald=s ideas, econometrics  did not embrace statistical 
decision theory. Instead, it focused on identification, estimation, and statistical inference. No contribution 
in Cowles Monograph 10 (Koopmans, 1950) mentions statistical decision theory. Only one does so briefly 
in Cowles Monograph 14 (Hood and Koopmans, 1953). This appears in a chapter by Koopmans and Hood 
(1953), who refer to estimates of structural parameters as “raw materials, to be processed further into 
solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems.” See Section 4.1 for further discussion. 
 Modern econometricians continue to view parameter estimates as “raw materials” that may be used to 
solve decision problems. A widespread practice has been as-if optimization: specification of a model, point 
estimation of its parameters, and use of the point estimate to make a decision that would be optimal if the 
estimate were accurate. As-if optimization, also called plug-in or two-step decision making, has heuristic 
appeal when a model is known to be correct but less so when the model may be incorrect. 
 A huge hole in econometric theory has been the absence of a broadly applicable means to evaluate as-
if optimization and other uses of econometric models in decision making. This paper proposes statistical 
decision theory as a framework for evaluating the performance of models. I set forth the general idea and 
apply it to two prevalent decision problems, prediction and treatment choice. 
 Section 2 reviews the core elements of statistical decision theory and then focuses on the important 
case of choice between two actions. The basic idea is simple, although it may be challenging to implement. 
One specifies a state space, listing all the states of nature that one believes feasible. One considers 
alternative statistical decision functions (SDFs), which map potentially observed data into decisions. In the 
frequentist statistics manner, one evaluates an SDF in each state of nature ex ante, by its mean performance 
across repeated samples. The true state is not known. Hence, one evaluates an SDF across the state space. 
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 I discuss three decision criteria that have drawn much attention: maximization of subjective expected 
welfare (aka minimization of Bayes risk), maximin, and minimax-regret. Minimization of Bayes risk and 
conditional Bayes decision making are mathematically equivalent in some contexts, but it is important not 
to conflate the two ideas; see Section 2.2.1. The maximin and minimax-regret criteria coincide in special 
cases, but they are generally distinct. 
 Section 3 shows how the Wald framework may be used to evaluate decision making with models. One 
specifies a model space, which approximates the state space in some way. A model-based decision uses the 
model space as if it were the state space. I consider the use of models to perform as-if optimization. My 
theme is that one should evaluate as-if optimization or any other model-based decision rule by its 
performance across the state space, not the model space. Thus, statistical decision theory embraces use of 
both correct and incorrect models to make decisions. I relate this idea to research on estimation of 
misspecified models, specification tests, and robust decisions, explaining the connections and differences. 
 Sections 4 and 5 consider two decision problems that have long been central to econometrics, 
prediction and treatment choice. Both subjects have drawn substantial attention from the conditional Bayes 
perspective but I think not nearly enough using the Wald framework. I summarize the small body of work 
to date evaluating the maximum regret of decision criteria. I present new computational findings on 
prediction and new analytical and computational findings on treatment choice. 
 Considered broadly, this paper adds to the argument made beginning in Manski (2000) and then in a 
sequence of subsequent articles for application of Wald’s statistical decision theory to econometrics. A 
small group of econometricians have made recent contributions towards this objective. The main focus of 
this work has been treatment choice with data from randomized trials, with contributions by Manski (2004, 
2005), Hirano and Porter (2009, 2019), Stoye (2009, 2012), Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019), and 
Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018). Manski (2007) and Athey and Wager (2019) have studied treatment choice 
with observational data. Chamberlain (2000, 2007) and Chamberlain and Moreira (2009) have used 
statistical decision theory to study estimation of some linear econometric models. Dominitz and Manski 
(2017, 2019) have studied prediction with missing data. 
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 The original contributions made here are varied. New perspective on the history of econometric 
thought permeates the paper. The idea proposed in Section 3---use of the Wald framework to evaluate as-
if optimization and other model-based decision rules, measuring performance across the state space rather 
than model space---is obvious in retrospect. Yet it has not been widely appreciated. The paper reports  new 
analysis of prediction and treatment choice as statistical decision problems in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
2. Statistical Decision Theory: Concepts and Practicalities 
 
 The Wald development of statistical decision theory directly addresses decision making with sample 
data. Wald began with the standard decision theoretic problem of a planner (or decision maker or agent) 
who must choose an action yielding welfare that depends on an unknown state of nature. The planner 
specifies a state space listing the states considered possible. He chooses without knowing the true state. 
 Wald added to this standard problem by supposing that the planner observes sample data that may be 
informative about the true state. He studied choice of a statistical decision function (SDF), which maps 
each potential data realization into a feasible action. He proposed evaluation of SDFs as procedures, chosen 
ex ante, specifying how a planner would use whatever data are realized. Thus, Wald=s theory is frequentist. 
 I describe general decision problems without sample data in Section 2.1 and with such data in Section 
2.2. Section 2.3 examines decisions that choose between two actions. Section 2.4 discusses the practical 
issues that challenge application of statistical decision theory. 
 
2.1. Decisions Under Uncertainty 
 
 Consider a planner who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with the state of nature.  
The planner has an objective function and beliefs about the feasible values of the true state. These are 
considered primitives. He must choose an action without knowing the true state. 
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 Formally, the planner faces choice set C and believes that the true state lies in set S, called the state 
space. The objective function w(∙, ∙): C × S ⇾ R1 maps actions and states into welfare. The planner ideally 
would maximize w(∙, s*), where s* is the true state. However, he only knows that s* ∈ S. 
 The choice set is commonly considered to be predetermined. The welfare function and the state space 
are subjective. The former formalizes what the planner wants to achieve and the latter expresses the states 
of nature he believes could possibly occur. As far as I am aware, Wald did not address how planners might 
select a welfare function and state space in practice.1 
 While the state space ultimately is subjective, its structure may use data that are informative by 
eliminating some states as possibilities. This idea is central to econometric analysis of identification. 
Haavelmo considered the state space to be a set of probability distributions that one thinks may possibly 
describe the economic system under study. The Koopmans (1949) formalization of identification 
contemplated unlimited data collection that enables one to shrink the state space, eliminating distributions 
that are inconsistent with the information revealed by observation. Koopmans put it this way (p. 132): 
“we shall base our discussion on a hypothetical knowledge of the probability distribution of the 
observations . . . . Such knowledge is the limit approachable but not attainable by extended 
observation. By hypothesizing nevertheless the full availability of such knowledge, we obtain a 
clear separation between problems of statistical inference arising from the variability of finite 
samples, and problems of identification in which we explore the limits to which inference even 
from an infinite number of observations is suspect.” 
In modern econometric language, the true state is point identified if maintained assumptions and the 
observational process eliminate all but one distribution for the economic system. It is partially identified if 
assumptions and observation eliminate some but not all distributions initially deemed possible. 
 
1 Ragnar Frisch, who supervised Haavelmo’s thesis, proposed late in his career that econometricians wanting to help 
planners make policy decisions might perform what is now called stated-preference elicitation; see, for example, Ben-
Akiva, McFadden, and Train (2019). In a lecture on “Cooperation between Politicians and Econometricians on the 
Formalization of Political Preferences,” Frisch (1971) proposed that an econometrician could elicit the “preference 
function” of a politician by posing a sequence of hypothetical policy-choice scenarios and asking the politician to 
choose between the policy options specified in each scenario. 
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 Given a welfare function and state space, a close to universally accepted prescription for decision 
making is that choice should respect dominance. Action c ∈ C is weakly dominated if there exists a d ∈ C 
such that w(d, s) ≥ w(c, s) for all s ∈ S and w(d, s) > w(c, s) for some s ∈ S. Even though the true state s* is 
unknown, choice of d is certain to weakly improve on choice of c. 
 There is no clearly best way to choose among undominated actions, but decision theorists have not 
wanted to abandon the idea of optimization. So they have proposed various ways of using the objective 
function w(, ∙) to form functions of actions alone, which can be optimized. In principle one should only 
consider undominated actions, but it often is difficult to determine which actions are undominated. Hence, 
in practice it is common to optimize over the full set of feasible actions.2 I define decision criteria 
accordingly in this paper. I also use max and min notation, without concern for the mathematical subtleties 
that sometimes make it necessary to use sup and inf operations. 
 One idea is to place a subjective probability distribution on the state space, average state-dependent 
welfare with respect to this distribution, and maximize the resulting function. This yields maximization of 
subjective average welfare. Let π be the specified distribution on S. For each feasible action c, ∫w(c, s)dπ 
is the mean of w(c, s) with respect to π. The criterion solves the problem 
 
(1)      max  ∫w(c, s)dπ. 
           c ∈ C 
 
 Another idea is to seek an action that, in some sense, works uniformly well over all elements of S. This 
yields the maximin and minimax-regret (MMR) criteria. The maximin criterion maximizes the minimum 
welfare attainable across the elements of S. For each feasible action c, consider the minimum feasible value 
of w(c, s); that is, min s ∊ S w(c, s). A maximin rule chooses an action that solves  
 
 
2 Maximizing over the full set of actions is inconsequential when the maximizing action is unique. Uniqueness ensures 
that this action is undominated. One should take care when multiple maximizing actions exist. Then there exist 
situations in which some may be dominated, depending on the decision criterion used. 
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(2)           max     min    w(c, s). 
                c ∈ C     s ∈ S 
 
 The MMR criterion chooses an action that minimizes the maximum loss to welfare that can result from 
not knowing the true state. An MMR choice solves 
 
(3)      min  max   [max w(d, s) − w(c, s)]. 
          c ∈ C   s ∈ S      d ∈ C 
 
Here max d ∊ C w(d, s) − w(c, s) is the regret of action c in state s; that is, the welfare loss associated with 
choice of c relative to an action that maximizes welfare in state s. The true state being unknown, one 
evaluates c by its maximum regret over all states and selects an action that minimizes maximum regret. The 
maximum regret of an action measures its maximum distance from optimality across states. Hence, an 
MMR choice is uniformly nearest to optimal among the feasible actions. 
 A planner who asserts a partial subjective distribution on the states of nature could maximize minimum 
subjective average welfare or minimize maximum average regret. These hybrid criteria combine elements 
of averaging across states and concern with uniform performance across states.3 I will confine discussion 
to the polar cases in which the planner asserts a complete subjective distribution or none. 
 
2.2. Statistical Decision Problems 
 
 Statistical decision problems add to the above structure by supposing that the planner observes  data 
generated by some sampling distribution. Sample data may be informative but, unlike the unlimited data 
contemplated in identification analysis, they do not enable one to shrink the state space. 
 Knowledge of the sampling distribution is generally incomplete. To express this, one extends the 
concept of the state space S to list the set of feasible sampling distributions, denoted (Qs, s ∈ S). Let Ψs 
 
3 Statistical decision theorists refer to these criteria as Γ-maximin and Γ-minimax regret (Berger, 1985). The former 
criterion has drawn considerable attention from axiomatic decision theorists, with the terminology maxmin expected 
utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). 
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denote the sample space in state s; that is, Ψs is the set of samples that may be drawn under sampling 
distribution Qs. The literature typically assumes that the sample space does not vary with s and is known. I 
maintain this assumption and denote the sample space as Ψ, without the s subscript. Then a statistical 
decision function c(): Ψ ⇾  C maps the sample data into a chosen action. 
 Wald’s concept of a statistical decision function embraces all mappings [data → action]. An SDF need 
not perform inference; that is, it need not use data to draw conclusions about the true state of nature. The 
prominent decision criteria that have been studied −− maximin, minimax-regret, and maximization of 
subjective average welfare −− do not refer to inference. The general absence of inference in statistical 
decision theory is striking and has been noticed; see Neyman (1962) and Blyth (1970). 
 Although SDFs need not perform inference, some do. That is, some have the sequential form [data → 
inference → action], first performing inference and then using the inference to make a decision. There 
seems to be no accepted term for such SDFs, so I call them inference-based. 
 SDF c() is a deterministic function after realization of the sample data, but it is a random function ex 
ante. Hence, the welfare achieved by c() is a random variable ex ante. Wald’s theory evaluates the 
performance of c() in state s by Qs{w[c(ψ), s]}, the ex-ante distribution of welfare that it yields across 
realizations ψ of the sampling process. 
 It remains to ask how planners might compare the welfare distributions yielded by different SDFs. 
Planners want to maximize welfare, so it seems self-evident that they should prefer SDF d() to c() in state 
s if Qs{w[d(ψ), s]} stochastically dominates Qs{w[c(ψ), s]}. It is less obvious how they should compare 
SDFs whose welfare distributions do not stochastically dominate one another. 
 Wald proposed measurement of the performance of c() in state s by its expected welfare across 
samples; that is, Es{w[c(ψ), s]}  ∫w[c(ψ), s]dQs. An alternative that has drawn only slight attention 
measures performance by quantile welfare (Manski and Tetenov, 2014). Writing in a context where one 
wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, Wald used the term risk to denote the mean 
performance of an SDF across samples. 
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 In practice, one does not know the true state. Hence, one evaluates c() by the state-dependent  expected 
welfare vector (Es{w[c(ψ), s]}, s ∈ S). Using the term inadmissible to denote weak dominance when 
evaluating performance by risk, Wald recommended elimination of inadmissible SDFs from consideration. 
As in decision problems without sample data, there is no clearly best way to choose among admissible 
SDFs. Ferguson (1967) put it this way (p. 28): 
“It is a natural reaction to search for a ‘best’ decision rule, a rule that has the smallest risk no matter 
what the true state of nature. Unfortunately, situations in which a best decision rule exists are rare 
and uninteresting. For each fixed state of nature there may be a best action for the statistician to 
take. However, this best action will differ, in general, for different states of nature, so that no one 
action can be presumed best overall.” 
He went on to write (p. 29): “A reasonable rule is one that is better than just guessing.” 
 Statistical decision theory has mainly studied the same decision criteria as has decision theory without 
sample data. Let Γ be a specified set of feasible SDFs, each mapping Ψ ⇾ C. The statistical versions of 
decision criteria (1), (2), and (3) are 
 
(4)           max  ∫Es{w[c(ψ), s]} dπ, 
               c() ∈ Γ 
 
 
(5)           max      min   Es{w[c(ψ), s]}, 
               c() ∈ Γ    s ∈ S 
 
 
(6)           min    max   ( max w(d, s) − Es{w[c(ψ), s]}). 
              c() ∈ Γ    s ∈ S       d ∈ C 
 
I discuss these criteria below, focusing on (4) and (6). 
 
2.2.1. Bayes Decisions 
 Considering contexts where one wants to minimize loss rather than maximize welfare, research in 
statistical decision theory often refers to criterion (4) as minimization of Bayes risk.  This term may seem 
odd given the absence of any reference in (4) to Bayesian inference. Criterion (4) simply places a subjective 
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distribution π on the state space ex ante and optimizes the resulting subjective average welfare. No posterior 
distribution computed after observation of data appears in the criterion. 
 Justification for use of the word Bayes when considering (4) rests on a mathematical result relating 
this criterion to conditional Bayes decision making. The conditional Bayes approach calls on one to first 
perform Bayesian inference, which uses the likelihood function for the observed data to transform the prior 
distribution on the state space into a posterior distribution, without reference to a decision problem. One 
then chooses an action that maximizes posterior subjective average welfare. See, for example, the text of 
DeGroot (1970) or discussions of applications to randomized trials in articles such as Spiegelhalter, 
Freedman, and Parmar (1994) and Scott (2010). 
 As described above, conditional Bayes decision making is unconnected to Wald’s frequentist statistical 
decision theory. However, suppose that the set of feasible statistical decision functions is unconstrained and 
that certain regularity conditions hold. Then it follows from Fubini’s Theorem that the conditional Bayes 
decision for each possible data realization solves Wald’s problem of maximization of subjective average 
welfare. See Berger (1985, Section 4.4.1) for general analysis and Chamberlain (2007) for application to a 
linear econometric model with instrumental variables. On the other hand, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) 
and Athey and Wager (2019) study treatment-choice problems in which the set of feasible decision 
functions is constrained. Wald’s criterion (4) need not yield the same actions as conditional Bayes decision 
making in these constrained settings. 
 The equivalence of Wald’s criterion (4) and conditional Bayes decisions is a mathematical result that 
holds under specified conditions. Philosophical advocates of the conditional Bayes paradigm go beyond the 
mathematics. They assert as a self-evident axiom that decision making should condition on observed data 
and should not perform frequentist thought experiments that contemplate how statistical decision functions 
perform in repeated sampling; see, for example, Berger (1985, Chapter 1). 
 Considering the mathematical equivalence of minimization of Bayes risk and conditional Bayes 
decisions, Berger asserted that that the conditional Bayes perspective is normatively “correct” and that the 
Wald frequentist perspective is “bizarre.” He stated (p. 160): 
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“Note that, from the conditional perspective together with the utility development of loss, the 
correct way to view the situation is that of minimizing ρ(π(θ|x), a). One should condition on what 
is known, namely x  . . . . and average the utility over what is unknown, namely θ. The desire to 
minimize r(π, δ) would be deemed rather bizarre from this perspective.” 
In this passage, a is an action, x is data, θ is a state of nature, π(θ|x) is the posterior distribution on the state 
space, ρ is posterior loss with choice of action a, δ is a statistical decision function, π is the prior distribution 
on the state space, and r(π, δ) is the Bayes risk of δ. 
 I view Berger’s normative statement to be overly enthusiastic for two reasons. First, the statement does 
not address how decisions should be made when part of the decision is choice of a procedure for collection 
of data, as in experimental or sample design. Such decisions must be made ex ante, before collecting the 
data. Hence, frequentist consideration of the performance of decision functions across possible realizations 
of the data is inevitable. Berger recognized this in his chapter on “Preposterior and Sequential Analysis.” 
 Second, the Bayesian prescription for conditioning decision making on sample data presumes that the 
planner feels able to place a credible subjective prior distribution on the state space. However, Bayesians 
have long struggled to provide guidance on specification of priors and the matter continues to be 
controversial. See, for example, the spectrum of views regarding Bayesian analysis of randomized trials 
expressed by the authors and discussants of Spiegelhalter, Freedman, and Parmar (1994). The controversy 
suggests that inability to express a credible prior is common in actual decision settings. 
 When one finds it difficult to assert a credible subjective distribution, Bayesians may suggest use of 
some default distribution, called a “reference” or “conventional” or “objective” prior; see Berger (2006). 
However, there is no consensus on the prior that should play this role. The chosen prior affects decisions. 
 
2.2.2. Focus on Maximum Regret 
 Concern with specification of priors motivated Wald (1950) to study the minimax criterion. He wrote 
(p. 18): “a minimax solution seems, in general, to be a reasonable solution of the decision problem when 
an a priori distribution . . . . does not exist or is unknown to the experimenter.” 
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 I similarly am concerned with decision making in the absence of a subjective distribution on the state 
space. However, I have mainly measured the performance of SDFs by maximum regret rather than by 
minimum expected welfare. The maximin and MMR criteria are sometimes confused with one another, but 
they are equivalent only in special cases, particularly when the value of optimal welfare is invariant across 
states of nature. The criteria obviously differ more generally. Whereas maximin considers only the worst 
outcome that an action may yield across states, MMR considers the worst outcome relative to what is 
achievable in a given state. 
 Practical and conceptual reasons motivate focus on maximum regret. From a practical perspective, 
MMR decisions behave more reasonably than do maximin ones in the important context of treatment choice 
with data from randomized trials. In common settings with balanced designs, the MMR rule is well 
approximated by the empirical success rule, which chooses the treatment with the highest observed average 
outcome in the trial; see Section 5. In contrast, the maximin criterion ignores the trial data, whatever they 
may be. This was recognized verbally by Savage (1951), who stated that the criterion is “ultrapessimistic” 
and wrote (p. 63): “it can lead to the absurd conclusion in some cases that no amount of relevant 
experimentation should deter the actor from behaving as though he were in complete ignorance.” Savage 
did not flesh out this statement, but it is easy to show that this occurs with trial data; see Manski (2004). 
 The conceptual appeal of using maximum regret to measure performance is that maximum regret 
quantifies how lack of knowledge of the true state of nature diminishes the quality of decisions. While the 
term “maximum regret” has been standard in the literature, this term is a shorthand for the maximum sub-
optimality of a decision criterion across the feasible states of nature. An SDF with small maximum regret 
is uniformly near-optimal across all states. This is a desirable property. 
 Minimax regret has drawn diverse reactions from decision theorists. In a famous early critique, 
Chernoff (1954) observed that MMR decisions are not always consistent with the choice axiom known as 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). He considered this a serious deficiency, writing (p. 426): 
“A third objection which the author considers very serious is the following.  In some examples, the 
min max regret criterion may select a strategy d3 among the available strategies d1, d2, d3, and d4.  
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On the other hand, if for some reason d4 is made unavailable, the min max regret criterion will 
select d2 among d1, d2, and d3. The author feels that for a reasonable criterion the presence of an 
undesirable strategy d4 should not have an influence on the choice among the remaining strategies.” 
This passage is the totality of Chernoff’s argument. He introspected and concluded that reasonable decision 
criteria should always adhere to the IIA axiom, but he did not explain why he felt this way. Chernoff’s view 
has been endorsed by some modern decision theorists, such as Binmore (2009). However, Sen (1993) 
argued that adherence to axioms such as IIA does not per se provide a sound basis for evaluation of decision 
criteria. He asserted that consideration of the context of decision making is essential. 
 Manski (2011) argued that adherence to the IIA axiom is not a virtue per se. What matters is how 
violation of the axiom affects welfare. I observed that the MMR violation of the IIA axiom does not yield 
choice of a dominated SDF. The MMR decision is always undominated when it is unique. There generically 
exists an undominated MMR decision when the criterion has multiple solutions. Hence, I concluded that 
violation of the IIA axiom is not a sound rationale to dismiss minimax regret. 
 
2.2.3. Choosing the Welfare Function, State Space, and Decision Criterion 
 In principle, statistical decision theory views the welfare function, state space, and decision criterion 
as separate meta-choices made the planner. The welfare function expresses what the planner wants to 
achieve. The state space lists all states that he believes might occur. The decision criterion expresses how 
he wants to cope with uncertainty. Statistical decision theory views these meta-choices as predetermined 
rather than as matters to be studied within the theory. 
 Arguably, planners might choose welfare functions, state spaces, and decision criteria jointly rather 
separately. A practical reason is that some joint choices yield decision problems that are easier to solve than 
others. Hence, planner might find it desirable to make a joint choice that yields tractable solutions. I will 
discuss tractability in Section 2.4 and throughout Sections 3 to 5. 
 A fundamental issue for meta-choice is that some choices may not be implementable. Consider, for 
example, maximization of subjective expected welfare when the state space is nonparametric. It is 
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mathematically delicate to specific subjective distributions on nonparametric spaces. For example, the 
familiar notion of a flat prior may not be well-defined. 
 Another issue is that implementable choices which initially seem appealing may yield solutions that 
seem “unattractive” in some sense. An example is Savage’s conclusion, discussed above, that maximin 
treatment choice with data from a randomized trial is unattractive because it ignores the data entirely.4 
 
2.3. Binary Choice Problems 
 
 SDFs for binary choice problems are simple and interesting. They can always be viewed as hypothesis 
tests. Yet the Wald perspective on testing differs considerably from that of Neyman-Pearson. 
 Let choice set C contain two actions, say {a, b}. A SDF c(∙) partitions Ψ into two regions that separate 
the data yielding choice of each action. These are Ψc()a ≡ [ψ  Ψ: c(ψ) = a] and Ψc()b ≡ [ψ  Ψ: c(ψ) = b]. 
 A test motivated by the choice problem partitions state space S into two regions, say Sa and Sb, that 
separate the states in which actions a and b are uniquely optimal. Thus, Sa contains the states [s ∈ S: w(a, 
s) > w(b, s)] and Sb contains [s ∈ S: w(b, s) > w(a, s)]. The choice problem does not provide a rationale for 
allocation of states in which the actions yield equal welfare. The standard practice is to give one action, say 
a, a privileged status and to place all states yielding equal welfare in Sa. Then Sa ≡ [s ∈ S: w(a, s) ≥ w(b, s)] 
and Sb ≡ [s ∈ S: w(b, s) > w(a, s)]. 
 In the language of testing, SDF c(∙) performs a test with acceptance regions Ψc(∙)a and Ψc(∙)b. When ψ ∈ 
Ψc(∙)a, c(∙) accepts the hypothesis {s ∈ Sa} by setting c(ψ) = a. When ψ ∈ Ψc(∙)b, c(∙) accepts the hypothesis 
{s ∈ Sb} by setting c(ψ) = b. I use the word “accepts” rather than the traditional term “does not reject” 
because choice of a or b is an affirmative action. 
 
4 Stoye (2009) studies a more subtle case of decisions that ignore trial data entirely. This occurs when members of the 
population have an observable covariate that is continuously distributed across persons and when the state space does 
not constrain how treatment response varies with the covariate. His analysis focuses on MMR, but his method of proof 
uses the equivalence of MMR to maximization of subjective expected welfare with a certain worst-case prior. Hence, 
his result also holds for this case of maximization of subjective expected welfare. 
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 Although all SDFs for binary choice are interpretable as tests, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing and 
statistical decision theory evaluate tests in fundamentally different ways. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 contrast 
the two paradigms in general terms. Section 2.3.3 uses medical decision making to illustrate. 
 
2.3.1. Neyman-Pearson Testing 
 Let us review the basic practices of classical testing, developed by Neyman and Pearson (1928, 1933) 
and thereafter. These tests view the states {s ∈ Sa} and {s ∈ Sb} asymmetrically, calling the former the null 
hypothesis and the latter the alternative. The sampling probability of rejecting the null when it is correct is 
the probability of a Type I error. A longstanding convention has been to restrict attention to tests in which 
the probability of a Type I error is no larger than a predetermined value α, usually 0.05, for all s ∈ Sa. Thus, 
one restricts attentions to SDFs c(∙) for which Qs[c(ψ) = b] ≤ α for all s ∈ Sa. 
 Among tests that satisfy this restriction, it is thought desirable to use ones that have uniformly high 
power; that is, small probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis when it is correct, called the 
probability of a Type II error. However, it generally is not possible to attain small probability of a Type II 
error for all s ∈ Sb. Letting S be a metric space, the probability of Type II error typically approaches 1 − α 
as s ∈ Sb nears the boundary of Sa.5 Given this, the practice has been to restrict attention to states in Sb that 
lie at least a specified distance from Sa. Let ρ be the metric on S. Let ρa > 0 be the specified minimum 
distance from Sa. Neyman-Pearson testing seeks small values for the maximum value of Qs[c(ψ) = a] over 
s ∈ Sb s. t. ρ(s, Sa) ≥ ρa. 
 
2.3.2. Expected Welfare of Tests 
 Decision theoretic evaluation of tests does not restrict attention to tests that yield a predetermined 
upper bound on the probability of a Type I error. Nor does it aim to minimize the maximum value of the 
probability of a Type II error when more than a specified minimum distance from the null hypothesis. Wald 
 
5 Manski and Tetenov (2016), Figure 1 demonstrates this in the context of treatment choice with data from a 
randomized trial. 
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proposed for binary choice, as elsewhere, evaluation of the performance of SDF c(∙) in state s by the 
expected welfare that it yields across realizations of the sampling process. He first addressed testing this 
way in Wald (1939). 
 The welfare distribution in state s in a binary choice problem is Bernoulli, with mass points max [w(a, 
s), w(b, s)] and min [w(a, s), w(b, s)]. These coincide if w(a, s) = w(b, s). When w(a, s) ≠ w(b, s), let Rc(∙)s 
denote the probability that c(∙) yields an error, choosing the inferior action over the superior one. That is, 
 
(7)              Rc(∙)s  =  Qs[c(ψ) = b]   if w(a, s) > w(b, s), 
                            =  Qs[c(ψ) = a]   if w(b, s) > w(a, s). 
 
The former and latter are the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors. Whereas Neyman-Pearson testing 
treats these error probabilities differently, statistical decision theory views them symmetrically. 
 The probabilities that welfare equals max [w(a, s), w(b, s)] and min [w(a, s), w(b, s)] are 1 − Rc(∙)s and 
Rc(∙)s. Hence, expected welfare in state s is 
 
(8)          Es{w[c(ψ), s]}  =  Rc(∙)s{min [w(a, s), w(b, s)]} + [1 − Rc(∙)s]{max [w(a, s), w(b, s)]} 
                                        =  max [w(a, s), w(b, s)]  −  Rc(∙)s|w(a, s) − w(b, s)|. 
 
The expression Rc(∙)s|w(a, s) − w(b, s)| is the regret of c(∙) in state s. Thus, regret is the product of the error 
probability and the magnitude of the welfare loss when an error occurs. 
 Evaluation of tests by expected welfare constitutes a fundamental difference between the perspectives 
of Wald and Neyman-Pearson. Planners should care about more than the probabilities of Type I and II error. 
They should care as well about the magnitudes of the losses to welfare that arise when errors occur. A given 
error probability should be less acceptable when the welfare difference between actions is larger. Neyman-
Pearson theory does not recognize this. 
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 Computation of regret in a specified state is usually tractable. The welfare magnitudes w(a, s) and w(b, 
s) are usually easy to compute. The error probability Rc(∙)s may not have an explicit form, but it can be 
approximated to any desired precision by Monte Carlo integration. One draws repeated pseudo-realizations 
of ψ from distribution Qs, computes the fraction of cases in which the resulting c(ψ) selects the inferior 
action, and uses this to estimate Rc(∙)s. 
 Whereas computation of regret in one state is tractable, computation of maximum regret across all 
feasible states may be burdensome. The state space commonly is uncountable in applications. A pragmatic 
process for coping with uncountable state spaces is to discretize the space, computing regret on a finite 
subset of states that reasonably approximate the full state space. 
 
2.3.3. Maximum Regret of Medical Decisions using Neyman-Pearson Tests and the Empirical Success Rule 
 Medical decision making illustrates well the difference between Neyman-Pearson testing and 
statistical decision theory. A core objective of randomized trials comparing medical treatments is to inform 
treatment choice. Often the objective is to compare an existing treatment, called standard care, with an 
innovation. The prevailing statistical practice has been to conclude that the innovation is better than 
standard care only if a Neyman-Pearson test rejects the null hypothesis that the innovation is no better than 
standard care. 
 Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019, 2020) compare the maximum regret of treatment choice using 
common Neyman-Pearson tests with decisions using the empirical success rule, which chooses a treatment 
that maximizes the average sample outcome in the trial. The simplest context is choice between two 
treatments, t = a and t = b, when the outcome of interest is binary, y(t) = 1 denoting success and y(t) = 0 
failure. State s indexes a possible value for the pair of outcome probabilities {Ps[y(a) = 1], Ps[y(b) = 1]}. 
The welfare yielded by treatment t in state s is w(t, s) = Ps[y(t) = 1]. The regret of SDF c() in state s is 
Rc()s|Ps[y(a) = 1] − Ps[y(b) = 1]|. 
 In these papers, we suppose that the planner has no a priori knowledge of the outcome probabilities. 
Hence, the state space is [0, 1]2. We approximate maximum regret by computing regret over a grid of states, 
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discretizing the state space. Examining a wide range of sample sizes and designs, we find that the empirical 
success rule yields results that are always much closer to optimal than those generated by common tests. 
 
2.4. Practicalities 
 
 Statistical decision theory has breathtaking generality. It enables comparison of all SDFs whose risk 
functions exist. It applies to any sample size, without asymptotic approximations. The state space may take 
any form. In Haavelmo’s formalization of econometrics, S is a space of probability distributions that  
describe the economic system under study. The state space may be finite or infinite dimensional. The theory 
is applicable when unlimited data collection would point or partially identify the true state. 
 Given these features, one might anticipate that statistical decision theory would play a central role in 
modern statistics and econometrics. Notable contributions by statisticians were made in the 1950s and 
1960s, as described in Ferguson (1967) and Berger (1985). However, the early period of development 
largely closed by the 1970s. Conditional Bayes analysis continued to develop, but as a self-contained field 
of study disconnected from Wald’s frequentist idea of maximization of subjective average welfare. 
 One reason why statistical decision theory lost momentum may have been diminishing interest in 
decision making as the motivation for analysis of sample data. Many modern statisticians and 
econometricians view the objective of research as inference for scientific understanding, rather than use of 
data in decision making. Another reason may have been the technical difficulty of the subject. Wald’s ideas 
are easy to apply in some settings, but they often are difficult to implement. 
 Consider the problems specified in (4) to (6). These problems are well-posed in principle, but they 
may not be solvable in practice. Each requires performance of three nested operations. The inner operation 
integrates across the sampling distribution of the data to determine expected welfare when a specified SDF 
c(∙) is used in each feasible state. The result is evaluation of c() by the state-dependent expected welfare 
vector (Es{w[c(ψ), s]}, s ∈ S). The middle operation averages or finds an extremum of the result of the 
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inner operation across the state space. The outer operation finds an extremum of the result of the middle 
operation across all SDFs. 
 Analytical arguments and numerical computation sometimes yield tractable solutions. Early analytical 
work in the conditional Bayes paradigm studied conjugate priors, which pair certain prior distributions on 
the state space with certain state-dependent sampling distributions for the data to yield simple posterior 
distributions. An important early analytical solution of an MMR problem was the Hodges and Lehmann 
(1950) study of point prediction of a bounded outcome under square loss, with data from a random sample. 
 Numerical computation was typically infeasible when statistical decision theory originated in the 
1940s, but it has become increasingly possible since then. Modern conditional Bayes analysis has 
increasingly moved away from use of conjugate priors to numerical computation of posterior distributions. 
Numerical determination of some maximin and MMR decisions has also become feasible. As discussed in 
Section 2.3.3, Manski and Tetenov (2016, 2019, 2020) found it feasible to compute maximum regret for 
binary treatment choice criteria with data from randomized trials. Computation of state-dependent expected 
welfare, the inner operation in problems (4) to (6), can now be accomplished numerically by Monte Carlo 
integration methods. Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) and Litvin and Manski (2020) report documented 
programs that use Monte Carlo integration to compute expected welfare for point predictors of random 
outcomes and for treatment-choice rules. 
 
3. Decision Making with Models 
 
3.1. Basic Ideas 
 
 I stated at the outset that decision theory begins with a planner who specifies a state space listing the 
states that he considers possible. Thus, the state space should include all states that the planner believes 
feasible and no others. The state space may be a large set that is difficult to contemplate in its entirety. 
Hence, it is common to make decisions using a model. 
21 
 
 The word “model” is used informally to connote a simplification or approximation of reality. Formally, 
a model specifies an alternative to the state space. Thus, model m replaces S with a model space Sm. A 
planner using a model acts as if the model space is the state space. For example, the planner might solve 
problem (4), (5), or (6) with Sm replacing S. Section 3.2 discusses another approach, as-if optimization. 
 The states contained in a model space may or may not be elements of the state space. The statistician 
George Box famously wrote (Box, 1979): “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” The phrase “all 
models are wrong” indicates that Box was thinking of models that simplify or approximate reality in a way 
that one believes could not possibly be correct; then Sm ∩ S = Ø. On the other hand, researchers often use 
models that they believe could be correct but are not necessarily so; then Sm ⊂ S. Economists have long 
used models of the second type. They have sought to evaluate such models in various ways. 
 A common practice when using models to point-predict macroeconomic outcomes is to compare 
predictions with observed realizations, judging the usefulness of models by the accuracy of the predictions. 
See, for example, Diebold (2015) and Patton (2019). Measurement of accuracy requires selection of a loss 
function, typically square or absolute loss. This connects empirical practice with decision theory. However, 
model evaluation is performed ex post, with respect to observed outcomes, rather than ex ante as in 
statistical decision theory. This makes the practice fundamentally different. 
 A common practice in econometric theory poses an estimator that consistently estimates a well-defined 
estimand when a specified model is correct and characterizes the estimand to which the estimate converges 
when the model is incorrect in some sense. For example, Goldberger (1968) observed that the least squares 
estimate of a linear regression model converges to the best linear predictor of y on x if E(y|x) is not a linear 
function of x. White (1982) observed that the maximum likelihood estimate of a specified model converges 
to the parameter that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler information criterion if the model is incorrect. Imbens 
and Angrist (1994) showed that an instrumental-variables estimate of a model of linear homogeneous 
treatment response converges to a local-average treatment effect if this model is incorrect but a certain 
monotonicity assumption holds. Historically, research of this type has not been connected to statistical 
decision theory. 
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 A persistent concern of econometric theory has been to determine when models have implications that 
may potentially be inconsistent with observable data. These models are called testable, refutable, or over-
identified. Working within the Neyman-Pearson paradigm, econometricians have developed specification 
tests, which take the null hypothesis to be that the model is correct and the alternative to be that it is 
incorrect; see, for example, Hausman (1978) and White (1982). Formally, the null is {s* ∈ Sm} and the 
alternative is {s* ∉ Sm}. However, econometricians have struggled to answer a central question raised by 
Haavelmo (1944) in his opening chapter on “Abstract Models and Reality” and restated succinctly in a 
recent paper by Masten and Poirier (2019). The latter authors write (p. 1): “What should researchers do 
when their baseline model is refuted?” They discuss the many ways that econometricians have sought to 
answer the question, and they offer new suggestions of their own. 
 The literatures cited above have not sought to evaluate the ex-ante performance of models in decision 
making. Statistical decision theory accomplishes this in a straightforward way. What matters is the SDF, 
say cm(∙), that one chooses using a model. As with any SDF, one measures the performance of cm(∙) by its 
vector of state-dependent expected welfares (Es{w[cm(ψ), s]}, s ∈ S). The relevant states for evaluation of 
performance are those in the state space S, not those in the model space Sm. 
 Thus, statistical decision theory operationalizes Box=s assertion that some models are useful. One 
should not make an abstract assertion that a model is or is not useful. Usefulness depends on the decision 
context. Useful model-based decision rules yield acceptably high state-dependent expected welfare across 
the state space, relative to what is possible in principle.  
 
3.1.1. Research on Robust Decisions 
 The remainder of this paper fleshes out the above ideas on evaluation of model-based decisions. Before 
then, I juxtapose these ideas with those expressed in related research on robust decisions. This includes, for 
example, the econometric work of Hansen, Sargent, and collaborators on robust macroeconomic modeling 
(e.g., Hansen and Sargent, 2001, 2008). The idea that the usefulness of a model depends on the decision 
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context has been appreciated in research on robust decisions. A review article by Watson and Holmes 
(2016) states (p. 466): 
“Statisticians are taught from an early stage that “essentially, all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” (Box and Draper, 1987). By “wrong” we will take to mean misspecified and by “useful” 
we will take to mean helpful for aiding actions (taking decisions), or rather a model is not useful if 
it does not aid any decision.” 
 Research on robust decisions proceeds in a different manner than does statistical decision theory. 
Rather than begin with specification of a state space, it begins with specification of a model. Having 
specified the model, a researcher may be concerned that it is not correct. To recognize this possibility, the 
researcher enlarges the model space locally, using a specified metric to generate a neighborhood of the 
model space. He then acts as if the locally enlarged model space is correct. Watson and Holmes write (p. 
465): “We then consider formal methods for decision making under model misspecification by quantifying 
stability of optimal actions to perturbations to the model within a neighbourhood of [the] model space.” 
 Although research on robust decisions differs procedurally from statistical decision theory, one can 
subsume the former within the latter if one considers the locally enlarged model space to be the state space. 
It is unclear how often this perspective characterizes what researchers have in mind. Published articles may 
not state explicitly that the constructed neighborhood of the model space encompasses all states that  authors 
deem feasible. The models specified in robust decision analyses often make strong assumptions and the 
generated neighborhoods often relax these assumptions only modestly. A state space should contain all 
states that one considers possible. 
 
3.2. As-If Optimization 
 
 A familiar econometric practice specifies a model space, typically called the parameter space. Sample 
data are used to select a point in the parameter space, called a point estimate of the parameter. The estimation 
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method is motivated by desirable statistical properties that hold if the model is correct; that is, if the true 
state of nature lies within the model space. 
 As-if optimization chooses an action that optimizes welfare as if the estimate is the true state.6 As-if 
optimization is a type of inference-based SDF. Whereas Wald supposed that a planner both performs 
research and makes a decision, in practice there commonly is an institutional separation between research 
and decision making. Researchers report inferences and planners use them to make decisions. Thus, 
planners perform the mapping [inference  decision] rather than the more basic mapping [data  decision]. 
Having researchers report estimates and planners use them as if they are accurate exemplifies this process. 
 Formally, a point estimate is a function s(): Ψ ⇾ Sm that maps data into the model space. As-if 
optimization means solution of the problem max c ∊ C w[c, s(ψ)]. When as-if optimization yields multiple 
solutions, one may use some auxiliary rule to choose among them. The result is an SDF c[s()], where  
 
(9)    c[s(ψ)]  ∈  argmax w[c, s(ψ)],     ψ ∈ Ψ. 
                              c ∈ C  
 
 A rationale for solving (9) is that this is often simpler than solving problems (4) to (6). Selecting a 
point estimate and using it to maximize welfare is easier than performing the nested operations required to 
solve (4) to (6). However, computational appeal does not suffice to justify this approach to decision making. 
 To motivate as-if optimization, econometricians often cite limit theorems of asymptotic theory that 
hold if the model is correct. They hypothesize a sequence of sampling processes indexed by sample size N 
and a corresponding sequence of point estimates sN(): ΨN ⇾  Sm. They show that the sequence is consistent 
when specified assumptions hold. That is, sN(ψ) ⇾ s* as N ⇾ , in probability or almost surely. They may 
prove further results regarding rate of convergence and the limiting distribution of the estimate. 
 
6 Econometricians often use the term “plug-in” or “two-step” rather than “as-if.” I prefer “as-if,” which makes explicit 
that one acts as if the model is correct. Discussion of as-if optimization has a long history in economics. A prominent 
case is the Friedman and Savage (1948) discussion of as-if expected utility maximization. 
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 Asymptotic arguments may be suggestive, but they do not prove that as-if optimization provides a 
well-performing SDF. Statistical decision theory evaluates as-if optimization in state s by the expected 
welfare Es{w{c[s(ψ)], s}} that it yields across samples of size N, not asymptotically. It calls for study of 
expected welfare across the state space, not the model space. 
 
3.2.1. As-If Optimization with Analog Estimates 
 Econometric research from Haavelmo onward has focused to a considerable degree on a class of 
problems that connect the state space and the sampling distribution in a simple way. These are problems in 
which states are probability distributions and the data are a random sample drawn from the true distribution. 
In such problems, a natural form of as-if optimization is to act as if the empirical distribution of the data is 
the true population distribution. Thus, one specifies the model space as the set of all possible empirical 
distributions and uses the observed empirical distribution as the estimate of the true state. 
 Goldberger (1968) called this the analogy principle. He wrote (p. 4): “The analogy principle of 
estimation . . . . proposes that population parameters be estimated by sample statistics which have the same 
property in the sample as the parameters do in the population.” The empirical distribution consistently 
estimates the population distribution and has further desirable properties. This suggests decision making 
using the empirical distribution as if it were the true population distribution. 
 
3.2.2. As-If Decisions with Set Estimates 
 As-if optimization uses data to compute a point estimate of the true state and chooses an action that 
optimizes welfare as if this estimate is accurate. An obvious, but rarely applied, extension is to use data to 
compute a set-valued estimate and act as if the set estimate is accurate. Whereas a point estimate s(∙) maps 
data into an element of Sm, a set estimate S(∙) maps data into a subset of Sm. 
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 For example, S(∙) could be a confidence set or an analog estimate of the identification region for a 
partially identified state. Sections 4.2 and 5.3 apply the latter idea to prediction and treatment choice. 
Decision making using confidence sets as set estimates is a topic for future research.7 
 Given data ψ, one could act as if the state space is S(ψ) rather than the larger set S. Specifically, one 
could solve these data-dependent versions of problems (1) through (3): 
 
(1')            max  ∫w(c, s)dπ(ψ), 
                  c ∈ C 
 
 
(2')            max     min    w(c, s),  
                  c ∈ C     s ∈ S(ψ) 
 
 
(3')            min     max    [max w(d, s) − w(c, s)]. 
                   c ∈ C     s ∈ S(ψ)    d ∈ C 
 
In the case of (1'), π(ψ) is a subjective distribution on the set S(ψ). 
 These as-if problems are generally easier to solve than are problems (4) to (6). The as-if problems fix 
ψ and select one action c, whereas problems (4) to (6) require one to consider all potential samples and 
choose a decision function c(). The as-if problems compute welfare values w(c, s), whereas (4) to (6) 
compute more complex expected welfare values Es{w[c(ψ), s]}.8 
 It is important not to confuse as-if decision making with set estimates as described here with the 
practice of sensitivity analysis, which does not apply statistical decision theory. A sensitivity analysis may 
compute multiple point estimates under alternative assumptions. One may then perform as-if optimization 
 
7 A confidence set with coverage probability α is a set estimate S(⋅) such that Qs[ψ: s ∈ S(ψ)] ≥ α , all s ∈ S. Researchers 
have used confidence sets to quantify imprecision of inference, without reference to decision problems. Nevertheless, 
they could be used to make as-if decisions. When studying this possibility, I expect that it will be productive to abandon 
the conventional practice of a priori fixing the coverage probability of a confidence set. This practice mirrors Neyman-
Pearson testing, which restricts attention to test statistics that yield at most a specified probability of Type I error. 
8 An alternative approach replaces S by S(ψ) in the middle operations of (4) to (6), but it does not replace Es{w[c(ψ), 
s]} by w(c, s) in the innermost operations. This simplifies (4) to (6) by shrinking the state space over which the middle 
operations are performed. However, it is more complex than (1) to (3) for two reasons. It requires choice of a decision 
function c() rather than a single action c, and it must compute Es{w[c(ψ), s]} rather than w(c, s). Chamberlain (2000) 
used asymptotic considerations to suggest this type of as-if decision and presented an application. 
27 
 
with each estimate, yielding multiple alternative decisions. When the multiple estimates or decisions 
coincide, researchers sometimes state that the result is “robust,” although this meaning of “robust” differs 
from that in Section 3.1.1. When sensitivity analysis yields multiple disparate decisions, it does not offer a 
prescription for decision making.  
 
4. Prediction with Sample Data 
 
4.1. Haavelmo on Prediction 
 
 A familiar case of as-if optimization occurs when states are distributions for a real random variable 
and the decision is to predict the value of a realization drawn from the true distribution. When welfare is 
measured by square and absolute loss, the best predictors in each state are well-known to be the population 
mean and median. When the true distribution is not known but data from a random sample are observed, 
the analogy principle suggests use of the sample average and median as predictors. 
 In his chapter on “Problems of Prediction,” Haavelmo (1944) questioned this common application of 
as-if optimization and instead recommended application of the Wald theory. In his section on “General 
Formulation of the Problem of Prediction,” he wrote (p. 109): “We see therefore that the seemingly logical 
‘two-step’ procedure of first estimating the unknown distribution of the variables to be predicted and then 
using this estimate to derive a prediction formula for the variables may not be very efficient.” Citing Wald 
(1939), he proposed computation of the state-dependent risk for any proposed predictor function. 
 Letting E2 denote a predictor function and (x1, x2, . . , , xN) the sample data, he wrote (p. 109): “We 
have to choose E2 as a function of x1, x2, . . , , xN, and we should, naturally, try to choose E2(x1, x2, . . , , xN) 
in such a way that r (the ‘risk’) becomes as small as possible.” He recognized that there generally does not 
exist a predictor function that minimizes risk across all states of nature.  Hence, he suggested a feasible 
approach. I quote in full this key passage, which uses the notation Ω1 to denote the state space (p. 116): 
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“In general, however, we may expect that no uniformly best prediction function exists. Then we 
have to introduce some additional principles in order to choose a prediction function. We may then, 
first, obviously disregard all those prediction functions that are such that there exists another 
prediction function that makes r smaller for every member of Ω1. If this is not the case we call the 
prediction function considered an admissible prediction function. To choose between several 
admissible prediction functions we might adopt the following principle, introduced by Wald: For 
every admissible prediction function E2 the ‘risk’ r is a function of the true distribution p. Consider 
that prediction function E2, among the admissible ones, for which the largest value of r is at a 
minimum (i.e., smaller than or at most equal to the largest value of r for any other admissible E2). 
Such a prediction function, if it exists, may be said to be the least risky among the admissible 
prediction functions.” 
Thus, following Wald, Haavelmo suggested elimination of inadmissible predictors followed by choice of a 
minimax predictor among those that are admissible. 
 It may be that econometrics would have progressed to make productive use of statistical decision 
theory if Haavelmo had been able to pursue this idea further. However, in his next section on “Some 
Practical Suggestions for the Derivation of Prediction Formulae,” he cautioned regarding the practicality 
of the idea, writing (p. 111): “The apparatus set up in the preceding section, although simple in principle, 
will in general involve considerable mathematical problems and heavy algebra.” 
 Aiming for tractability, Haavelmo sketched an example of as-if optimization that chooses an action 
using a maximum likelihood estimate of a specific finite-dimensional parametric model. He noted that one 
could study the state-dependent risk of the resulting SDF, but he did not provide analysis. With this, his 
chapter on prediction ended. Thus, Haavelmo initiated econometric consideration of statistical decision 
theory but, stymied by computational intractability, he found himself unable to follow through. 
 Nor did other econometricians follow through in the period after publication of Haavelmo (1944). I 
observed earlier that no contribution in Cowles Monograph 10 mentioned statistical decision theory and 
only one did so briefly in Cowles 14. Cowles 10 and 14 contain several chapters by Haavelmo and by Wald, 
but these concern different subjects. The only mention in Cowles 14 appeared in Koopmans and Hood 
(1953). Considering “The Purpose of Estimation,” they wrote (p. 127): 
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“if a direct prediction problem . . . . can be isolated and specified, the choice of a method of 
estimation should be discussed in terms of desired properties of the joint distribution of the 
prediction(s) made and the realized values(s) of the variables(s) predicted. In particular, in a 
precisely defined prediction problem of this type, one may know the consequence of various 
possible errors of prediction and would then be able to use predictors minimizing the mathematical 
expectation of losses due to such errors. Abraham Wald [1939, 1945, 1950c], among others, has 
proposed methods of statistical decision-making designed to accomplish this.” 
However, they went on to state that neither they nor other contributors to Cowles 14 apply statistical 
decision theory to prediction. They wrote (p. 127): 
“The more classical methods of estimation applied in this volume are not as closely tailored to any 
one particular prediction problem. Directed to the estimation of structural parameters rather than 
values of endogenous variables, they yield estimates that can be regarded as raw materials, to be 
processed further into solutions of a wide variety of prediction problems---in particular, problems 
involving prediction of the effects of known changes in structure.” 
This passage expresses the broad thinking that econometricians have used to motivate as-if optimization. 
 
4.2. Prediction under Square Loss 
 
 Haavelmo discussed application of statistical decision theory to prediction briefly and abstractly. 
Subsequent research has focused on the case of square loss. Here the risk of a candidate predictor using 
sample data is the sum of the population variance of the outcome and the mean square error (MSE) of the 
predictor as an estimate of the mean outcome. The regret of a predictor is its MSE as an estimate of the 
mean. An MMR predictor minimizes maximum MSE. MMR prediction of the outcome is equivalent to 
minimax estimation of the population mean. 
 One of the earliest practical findings of statistical decision theory was reported by Hodges and Lehman 
(1950). They derived the MMR predictor under square loss with data from a random sample, when the 
outcome has known bounded range and all sample data are observed. They assumed no knowledge of the 
shape of the outcome distribution. Let the outcome range be [0, 1]. Then the MMR predictor is (μN√N + 
½)/(√N + 1), where N is sample size and μN is the sample average outcome. 
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4.2.1. Prediction with Missing Data: Known Observability Rate 
 Dominitz and Manski (2017, 2019) have extended study of prediction of a bounded outcome under 
square loss to settings in which some population outcomes are unobservable. It is challenging to determine 
the MMR predictor when data are missing. Seeking a tractable approach, the paper studied as-if MMR 
prediction. The analysis assumed knowledge of the population rate of observing outcomes, but it assumed 
no knowledge of the distributions of observed and missing outcomes. It used the empirical distribution of 
the observed sample data as if it were the population distribution of observable outcomes. Let K be the 
number of observed sample outcomes, which is fixed rather than random under the assumed survey design. 
 With no knowledge of the distribution of missing outcomes, the population mean is partially identified 
when the outcome is bounded. Let y be the outcome, normalized to lie in the [0, 1] interval. Let δ indicate 
observability of an outcome, P(δ = 1) and P(δ = 0) being the fractions of the population whose outcomes 
are and are not observable. Manski (1989) showed that the identification region for E(y) is the interval 
[E(y|δ = 1)P(δ = 1), E(y|δ = 1)P(δ = 1) + P(δ = 0)]. 
 If this interval were known, the MMR predictor would be its midpoint E(y|δ = 1)P(δ = 1) + ½P(δ = 0). 
The interval is not known with sample data, but one can compute its sample analog and use its midpoint 
EK(y|δ = 1)P(δ = 1) + ½P(δ = 0) as the predictor. This midpoint predictor is easy to compute. Dominitz and 
Manski (2017) showed that its maximum regret  is ¼[P(δ = 1)2/K + P(δ = 0)2].9 
 This result presumes a state space that places no restrictions on the distributions of observable and 
unobservable outcomes. Researchers often assume that data are missing at random. That is, they pose a 
model space in which the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes are the same. They then 
use the sample average of observed outcomes as the predictor. This practice is reasonable when data 
actually are missing at random. Dominitz and Manski caution against it when the state space does not 
 
9 MSE equals variance plus squared bias. In this prediction problem, maximum MSE across all outcome distributions 
is the sum of maximum variance and maximum squared bias. Maximum variance is ¼P(δ = 1)2/K, which occurs when 
P(y = 1|δ = 1) = ½. Maximum squared bias is ¼P(δ = 0)2, which occurs when P(y = 1|δ = 0) equals 0 or 1. 
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restrict the distributions of observable and unobservable outcomes. Then the maximum regret of the sample-
average predictor necessarily exceeds that of the midpoint predictor, in some cases substantially so. 
 
4.2.2.  Prediction with Missing Data: Unknown Observability Rate 
 The above analysis assumes knowledge of the population rate of observable outcomes. A midpoint 
predictor remains computable when P(δ) is not known and instead is estimated by its sample analog. 
Derivation of an analytical expression for maximum regret appears intractable, but numerical computation 
is feasible. Manski and Tabord-Meehan (2017) documents an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical 
computation of the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor and other user-specified predictors.10 
 Whereas Dominitz and Manski (2017) assumed a sampling process in which the number K of observed 
outcomes is fixed, the algorithm considers a process in which one draws at random a fixed number N of 
population members and sees the values of the observable outcomes. Hence, the number of observed 
outcomes is random rather than fixed. The midpoint predictor is EN(y|δ = 1)PN(δ = 1) + ½PN(δ = 0). This is 
an unbiased and consistent estimate of the midpoint of the identification region for E(y). 
 Table 1 uses the program to compute the maximum regret of the midpoint predictor when y is binary. 
Table 2 displays maximum regret for prediction by the sample average of observed outcomes. Panels A and 
B of each table differ in their specification of the feasible outcome distributions. All distributions are 
feasible in Panel A. Panel B bounds the difference between the distributions of observed and unobserved 
outcomes, assuming that −½ ≤ P(y = 1|δ = 1) − P(y = 1|δ = 0) ≤ ½. Thus, prediction poses a severe 
identification problem in Panel A, with data on observed outcomes revealing nothing about the distribution 
of unobserved outcomes. The identification problem is less severe in Panel B, where the assumption 
 
10 The program is applicable when y is binary or is distributed continuously. In the latter case, Ps(y|δ = 1) and Ps(y|δ = 
0) are approximated by Beta distributions. Subject to these restrictions on the shapes of outcome distributions, the user 
can specify the state space flexibly. For example, one may assume that nonresponse will be no higher than 80% or 
that the mean value of the outcome for nonresponders will be no lower than 0.5. One may impose no restrictions 
connecting the distributions Ps(y|δ = 1) and Ps(y|δ = 0), or one may bound the difference between these distributions. 
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constrains the distance between the two outcome distributions. Statistical imprecision is a problem in both 
cases, its severity diminishing with sample size. 
 Each row of a table specifies a sample size, in increments of 25 from 25 to 100. Each column is a value 
of the observability rate, in increments of 0.1 from 0.1 to 1. Given N and P(δ = 1), the cell gives the 
approximate value of maximum MSE across feasible pairs of conditional outcome distributions. In each 
state of nature, MSE is approximated by Monte Carlo integration across 5000 simulated samples.11 
Maximum MSE across feasible outcome distributions is approximated by maximizing over a uniform grid 
of 100 values for each of the Bernoulli parameters Ps(y = 1|δ = 1) and Ps(y = 1|δ = 0).12 Someone who does 
not know P(δ = 1) but who finds it credible to bound it can approximate maximum regret at a specified 
sample size by the maximum entry across the relevant column cells of the table. 
 To interpret the entries in the tables, keep in mind that the maximum MSE of a predictor is determined 
by both statistical imprecision and the identification problem created by missing data. Maximum variance 
decreases with sample size N. Maximum squared bias decreases with the observability rate P(δ = 1). 
 Table 1A shows that identification is the dominant inferential problem when the observability rate is 
less than 0.7. For all sample sizes from 25 to 100, computed maximum MSE is close to ¼P(δ = 0)2, the 
value of maximum squared bias. Imprecision is a more noticeable contributor to maximum MSE when the 
observability rate exceeds 0.7. When  the observability rate is 1, imprecision is the sole problem. 
 Table 1B constrains the state space to distributions satisfying −½ ≤ P(y = 1|δ = 1) − P(y = 1|δ = 0) ≤ 
½. This mitigates the identification problem, yet the entries in Table 1B are essentially the same as in Table 
1A. The explanation is that the states of nature generating maximum MSE when all distributions are feasible 
remain within the state space when the constraint is imposed. For all values of the observability rate, 
 
11 To create a simulated sample, the program draws N observations {δi, i = 1, . . . , N} from the distribution Ps(δ). Let 
K = ∑ i δi. It draws K observations {yi, i = 1, . . , K} at random from Ps(y|δ = 1). It is possible that K = 0, so the 
specified predictor must be defined for this case. The program uses the N simulated realizations of δ and the K 
realizations of y to compute a simulated value of the predictor. For a specified positive integer T, the program repeats 
the above T times and uses the T simulated values of the predictor to approximate its MSE in state s. 
12 Computation of regret on a finite grid of states implies that computed maximum regret is less than or equal to true 
maximum regret, with equality attained if the grid contains the state yielding true maximum regret. The accuracy of 
the approximation may be improved by increasing grid density, at the expense of increased computation time. 
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maximum MSE in Table 1A occurs when P(y = 1|δ = 1) = ½ and P(y = 1|δ = 0) equals either 0 or 1. These 
states are in the constrained state space of Table 1B. Hence, maximum MSE does not change. 
 Comparison of Tables 1A and 2A shows that, when all outcome distributions are feasible, the midpoint 
predictor always outperforms prediction by the sample average of observed outcomes. The maximum MSE 
of the former predictor is approximately ¼ the size of the latter when the observability rate is less than or 
equal to 0.8, and about ½ the size in the larger samples when the observability rate is 0.9. Constraining the 
state space in Table 2B changes the states that maximize regret for the sample-average predictor, improving 
its performance substantially. 
 
5. Treatment Choice with Sample Data 
 
5.1. Background 
  
 Econometricians and statisticians have studied treatment response in randomized trials and 
observational settings. Some research performs causal inference, without study of a decision problem. 
Some aims to inform treatment choice. I am concerned with the latter. 
 I use the formalization of Manski (2004) here. States of nature are possible distributions of treatment 
response for a population of observationally identical persons who are subject to treatment. The term 
“observationally identical” means that these persons share the same observed covariates. Groups of persons 
with different observed covariates are considered as separate populations. 
  The problem is to choose treatments for the population. Treatment response is assumed individualistic; 
that is, each person’s outcome may depend on the treatment he receives but not on treatments received by 
others. Welfare is the mean outcome across the population, as in utilitarian welfare economics. 
 Optimal treatment often is infeasible because the true distribution of treatment response is not known. 
Decision making may use data on the outcomes realized by a sample of the population. Some research 
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studies data from randomized trials, and some studies observational data. Either way, statistical decision 
theory may be used to evaluate the performance of SDFs, called statistical treatment rules in this context. 
 A simple way to use sample data is as-if optimization. Applying the analogy principle, one acts as if 
the empirical outcome distribution for each treatment equals its population outcome distribution. Emulating 
the fact that it is optimal to chooses a treatment that maximizes the mean population outcome, one chooses 
a treatment that maximizes the average sample outcome. This is called the empirical success (ES) rule. 
 When analyzing data from randomized trials, econometricians and statisticians have long used 
asymptotic arguments to motivate the ES rule, citing laws of large numbers and central limit theorems. A 
growing recent econometric literature has studied the maximum regret of the ES rule with trial data. 
 Consider an ideal randomized trial, where all subjects comply with assigned treatments and all realized 
outcomes are observed. Moreover, assume the distribution of treatment response is the same as in the 
population to be treated. Then the feasible states of nature are ones where, for each treatment, the population 
distribution of counterfactual outcomes equals that of realized outcomes. 
 Manski (2004) used a large-deviations inequality for sample averages of bounded outcomes to derive 
an upper bound on maximum regret in problems of choice between two treatments. Stoye (2009) showed 
that in trials with moderate sample size, the ES rule either exactly or approximately minimizes maximum 
regret in cases with two treatments and a balanced design. Hirano and Porter (2009, 2019) showed that the 
ES rule is asymptotically optimal in a formal decision-theoretic sense. Considering problems with multiple 
treatments or unbalanced designs, Manski and Tetenov (2016) used large deviations inequalities for sample 
averages of bounded outcomes to obtain upper bounds on the maximum regret of the ES rule. Kitagawa 
and Tetenov (2018) studied a generalization of the ES rule, called empirical welfare maximization, intended 
for application when the set of feasible treatment policies is constrained in various ways. 
 Econometricians have long analyzed data on realized treatments and outcomes in settings where 
treatments are chosen purposefully rather than randomly. Haavelmo (1944) put it this way (p. 7): “the 
economist is usually a rather passive observer with respect to important economic phenomena; he usually 
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does not control the actual collection of economic statistics. He is not in a position to enforce the 
prescriptions of his own designs of ideal experiments.” 
 An important contribution of early econometrics was to recognize that, when treatments are chosen 
purposefully, distributions of counterfactual and realized outcomes need not coincide.13 Haavelmo (1943), 
Section 1 showed this in the context of a linear model with homogeneous treatment response and the 
subsequent literature has generalized the finding substantially. Wanting to avoid the assumption of random 
treatment selection, econometricians have studied many models that use other assumptions to point-identify 
distributions of treatment response. 
 Recent applications of Wald’s statistical decision theory to treatment choice have mainly studied 
decision making with data from ideal trials. Exceptions are Manski (2007), Stoye (2012), and Athey and 
Wager (2019), each of which studies maximum regret for rules that choose between two treatments. Manski 
(2007) studied trials with selective attrition and treatment choice with observational data. Stoye (2012) 
examined trials with some forms of imperfect internal or external validity. Athey and Wager (2019) studied 
choice with observational data when the set of feasible treatment policies is constrained in various ways. 
Whereas Manski (2007) and Stoye (2012) provided finite-sample analysis in settings where average 
treatment effects are partially identified, Athey and Wager performed asymptotic analysis under 
assumptions that give point identification. 
 This paper presents new analysis of the maximum regret of rules for treatment with observational data 
when average treatment effects are partially identified. Section 5.2 develops algebraic findings for the limit 
case where one knows the distribution of realized outcomes in the study population. Section 5.3 reports 
numerical findings for treatment with sample data. 
 
 
13 The term “analysis of treatment response” has become widespread since the 1990s, but it was not used in early 
writing on econometrics. A central focus was identification and estimation of models of jointly determined treatments 
and outcomes. The mathematical notation typically defined symbols only for realized treatments and outcomes, 
leaving implicit the idea of potential outcomes under counterfactual treatments. See Manski (1995, Chapter 6) and 
Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000) for discussions that connect the early and recent literatures. 
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5.2. Treatment Choice with Knowledge of the Distribution of Realized Outcomes 
 
 I consider an observational study with two treatments {a, b} and outcomes taking values in [0, 1]. Each 
member of the study population has potential outcomes [y(a), y(b)]. Binary indicators [δ(a), δ(b)] denote 
whether these outcomes are observable. Realized outcomes are observable, but counterfactual ones are not, 
so the possible indicator values are [δ(a) = 1, δ(b) = 0] and [δ(a) = 0, δ(b) = 1]. State s denotes a possible 
distribution Ps[y(a), y(b), δ(a), δ(b)] of outcomes and observability. The problem is to choose between a 
and b in a treatment population with the same distribution of treatment response as the study population. 
 Given that realized outcomes are observed and counterfactual ones are not, P[δ(a) = 1] + P[δ(b) = 1] 
= 1. I use the notation p ≡ P[δ(b) = 1], with P[δ(a) = 1] = 1 – p. If 0 < p < 1, observation asymptotically 
reveals the true values of P[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], P[y(b)|δ(b) = 1], and p. Observation is uninformative about the 
counterfactual distributions P[y(a)|δ(a) = 0] and P[y(b)|δ(b) = 0]. This limit setting has been studied in 
partial identification analysis of treatment response, as in Manski (1990). I proceed likewise here. 
 
5.2.1. MMR Treatment Choice  
 Manski (2007), Proposition 1 proved a simple result that holds when the planner can make a fractional 
treatment allocation, assigning fraction z ∊ [0, 1] of the treatment population to treatment b and 1 – z to 
treatment a. Let all distributions of realized and counterfactual outcome distributions be feasible. Let 
P[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], P[y(b)|δ(b) = 1], and p be known. Then the unique MMR allocation is 
 
(10)        zMMR  =  E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]∙p  + {1 − E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]}(1 – p). 
 
Its maximum regret is zMMR(1 − zMMR). 
 It is often the case that a planner cannot make a fractional allocation, being constrained by laws or by 
norms calling for “equal treatment of equals” to provide the same treatment to all members of the 
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population; see Manski (2009). Moreover, a planner may be constrained to use a deterministic rather than 
randomized treatment rule. I study this setting here. 
 Section 2.3 showed that, in states where treatment a is better, the regret of an SDF is the product of the 
sampling probability that the rule commits a Type I error and the loss in welfare that occurs when choosing 
b. Similarly, in states where b is better, regret is the probability of a Type II error times the loss in welfare 
when choosing a. Thus, regret in state s is Rc(⋅)s⋅|Es[y(b)] − Es[y(a)]|. When the treatment rule is singleton 
and deterministic, the error probability can only equal 0 or 1. Thus, regret is either 0 or |Es[y(b)] − Es[y(a)]|. 
 With outcomes having range [0, 1], the counterfactual means E[y(a)|δ(a) = 0] and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 0] can 
take any values in this interval. Hence, by the Law of Iterated Expectations, the feasible values of E[y(a)] 
and E[y(b)] are 
 
(11a)    E[y(a)]  ∈  [E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]⋅(1 – p), E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]⋅(1 – p) + p],  
(11b)    E[y(b)]  ∈  [E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]⋅p, E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]⋅p + (1 – p)]. 
 
With choice of treatment a, regret is zero when Es[y(b)] < Es[y(a)] and positive when Es[y(b)] > Es[y(a)]. 
Maximum regret occurs when Es[y(a)|δ(a) = 0] = 0 and Es[y(b)|δ(b) = 0] = 1. Then regret is 
 
(12a)     Ras⋅|Es[y(b)] − Es[y(a)]|  =  E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]⋅p + {(1 – E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]}⋅(1 – p)  =  zMMR. 
   
With choice of b, maximum regret is 
 
(12b)    Rbs⋅|Es[y(b)] − Es[y(a)]|  =  E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]⋅(1 – p) + {1 − E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]}⋅p  =  1 − zMMR. 
 
Thus, treatment b minimizes maximum regret if zMMR ≥ ½ and treatment a if zMMR ≤ ½. 
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 This finding quantifies how constraining the planner to make a deterministic singleton treatment 
choice rather than a fractional allocation reduces welfare. The MMR value subject to the constraint is 
min(zMMR, 1 − zMMR). When fractional allocations are permitted, it is zMMR(1 − zMMR). 
 
5.2.2. Maximum Regret of the ES Rule 
 A common assumption made when interpreting observational data posits that counterfactual and 
realized outcome distributions coincide, as in an ideal trial. Then treatment choice with the ES rule is 
optimal when the distribution of realized outcomes is known. However, the ES rule need not perform as 
well with larger state spaces. I examine the setting in which all outcome distributions are feasible. 
 Given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes, the ES rule chooses treatment b if 
E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] > E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] and a if E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] < E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]. Either choice is consistent 
with the rule if E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1].14 
 When p = ½, the ES rule coincides with the deterministic singleton rule that minimizes maximum 
regret. We found above that treatment b minimizes maximum regret if zMMR ≥ ½ and treatment a if zMMR ≤ 
½. When p = ½, expression (10) reduces to zMMR = ½{E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] − E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]} + ½. 
 When p ≠ ½, the ES and MMR rules yield the same treatment choice in some cases but different 
choices in others. Both treatments are consistent with the ES rule if E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]. Both 
are consistent with the MMR rule when zMMR = ½. I focus on cases where neither equality holds.  
 When E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] > E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1], the ES rule chooses treatment a. By (12a), maximum regret 
is zMMR. When E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] > E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], the rule chooses b. By (12b), maximum regret is 1−zMMR. 
 
 
14 Maximum regret of the ES rule when E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] differs depending on whether a planner in 
this setting chooses a specified treatment or randomizes. Randomizing yields smaller maximum regret than choosing 
a specified treatment. 
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5.2.3. Illustration: Sentencing and Recidivism 
 To illustrate, I use the Manski and Nagin (1998) analysis of sentencing and recidivism of juvenile 
offenders in the state of Utah. The feasible treatments are sentencing options. Judges in Utah have had the 
discretion to order varying sentences for juvenile offenders. Some offenders have been sentenced to 
residential confinement (treatment a) and others have been given sentences with no confinement (treatment 
b). A possible policy would be to replace judicial discretion with a mandate that all offenders be confined. 
Another would be to mandate that no offenders be confined. 
 To compare these mandates, we took the outcome of interest to be recidivism in the two-year period 
following sentencing. Let y = 1 if an offender commits no new offense and y = 0 otherwise. No new offense 
was interpreted as treatment success, and commission of a new offense was interpreted as failure. 
 We obtained data on the sentences received and the recidivism outcomes realized by all male offenders 
in Utah born from 1970 through 1974 and convicted of offenses before they reached age 16. The data reveal 
that 11 percent of the offenders were sentenced to confinement and that 23 percent of these persons did not 
offend again in the two years following sentencing. The remaining 89 percent were sentenced to non-
confinement and 41 percent of these persons did not offend again. Thus, P[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] = 0.23, P[y(b)|δ(b) 
= 1] = 0.41, and p = 0.89. 
 Reviewing the criminology literature on sentencing and recidivism, we found little research on 
sentencing practices and disparate predictions of treatment response. Hence, we performed partial 
identification analysis of treatment response, assuming no knowledge of counterfactual outcomes. This 
makes the present analysis applicable. 
 Equation (12a) shows that the maximum regret of treatment a is (0.41)(0.89) + 0.11 – (0.23)(0.11) = 
0.45. Equation (12b) shows that the maximum regret of b is (0.23)(0.11) + 0.89 − (0.41)(0.89) = 0.55. 
Hence, treatment a minimizes maximum regret.  
 Suppose one assumes that Utah judges have sentenced offenders randomly to treatments and b. One 
then might use the ES rule to choose between the two. Given that 0.41 > 0.23, the result is choice of 
treatment b. Thus, the ES rule selects the treatment that is inferior from the minimax-regret perspective. 
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5.3. Treatment Choice with Observational Sample Data 
 
 The above analysis assumes knowledge of p, E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]. Suppose now that 
one only observes realized treatments and outcomes in a random sample of the population. Sample data are 
informative, but they do not reveal population distributions. Hence, the state space has the higher-
dimensional form {Ps[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], Ps[y(a)|δ(a) = 0], Ps[y(b)|δ(b) = 1], Ps[y(b)|δ(b) = 0], ps, s  S}. 
 Considering a planner who can make a fractional treatment allocation, Manski (2007), Proposition 2 
proved a simple result: choosing the sample analog of zMMR as the treatment allocation yields the same 
maximum regret as does zMMR. Here is the reasoning. The sample analog of zMMR is  
 
(13)         zN  =  EN[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]∙pN + {1 − EN[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]}(1 – pN) 
                     =  EN[y(b)∙δ(b)] − EN[y(a)∙δ(a)] + (1 – pN). 
 
The second equality shows that E(zN) = zMMR. This and the fact that welfare is linear in zMMR imply that the 
finite-sample maximum regret achieved by zN equals the maximum regret achieved by zMMR. 
 This finding extends to settings where a planner is not permitted to make a fractional allocation but 
can make a randomized singleton treatment choice. Consideration of randomized rules is inherently 
necessary when contemplating treatment choice with sample data because the data are themselves randomly 
drawn. It is easy to modify zN to obtain an MMR randomized singleton rule. Let u be a uniform random 
variable drawn independently of the sample data. Consider the rule zNu ≡ 1[u ≤ zN]. Then E(zNu|zN) = zN and 
E(zNu) = E[E(zNu|zN)] = E(zN) = zMMR. 
 Now suppose that a planner is further constrained to make treatment choice a deterministic singleton 
function of the empirical distribution of realized outcomes and treatments. Thus, randomization with an 
independent uniform random variable is not permitted. The ES rule remains feasible. Another possibility, 
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which I will call the asymptotic minimax-regret (AMMR) rule, chooses treatment b if zN > ½ and a if zN < 
½, with a specified default choice made if zN = ½. 
 Algebraic computation of the maximum regret of the AMMR and ES rules appears intractable, a 
difficulty being that state-dependent error probabilities generally do not have explicit forms. Litvin and 
Manski (2020) documents an algorithm coded in STATA for numerical computation of the maximum regret 
of these and other user-specified treatment rules in settings with binary outcomes. Coding for the AMMR, 
ES, and some decision rules using instrumental variables is built in, including default treatment choices 
when a rule does not yield a unique choice. 
 The program uses Monte Carlo integration to approximate state-dependent error probabilities for a 
specified rule. Maximum regret is approximated by computing regret on a grid that discretizes the state 
space. The state space specifies feasible values for the five Bernoulli distributions {Ps[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], 
Ps[y(a)|δ(a) = 0], Ps[y(b)|δ(b) = 1], Ps[y(b)|δ(b) = 0], Ps[δ(b) = 1)], s  S}. A user can place a flexible set of 
constraints on the feasible distributions. One may place lower and/or upper bounds on the values of the 
Bernoulli probabilities. One may impose no restrictions connecting distributions of realized and 
counterfactual outcome, or one may bound the difference between these distributions. 
 Tables 3 and 4 use the program to compute the maximum regret of the AMMR and ES rules. Panels 
A and B of each table differ in the feasible outcome distributions. All distributions are feasible in Panel A. 
Panel B bounds the difference between distributions of realized and counterfactual outcomes, assuming that 
−½ ≤ P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 1] – P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 0] ≤ ½, t ∊ {a, b}. 
 Each row of a table specifies a sample size N, in increments of 25 from 25 to 100. Each column is a 
value of p, in increments of 0.1 from 0.5 to 9. It is unnecessary to consider values of p below 0.5 because 
the state space in each panel views the two treatments symmetrically; hence, maximum regret is the same 
for p and 1 – p. 
 Given values for N and p, a cell entry presents the approximate value of maximum regret across 
feasible values of {P[y(t)|δ(t) = 1], P[y(t)|δ(t) = 0]}, t ∊ {a, b}. In each state of nature, regret is approximated 
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by Monte Carlo integration across 5000 simulated samples.15 Maximum regret across feasible Bernoulli 
distributions is approximated by maximizing over a grid of 25 values for each Bernoulli parameter. 
Someone who does not know p but who finds it credible to bound it can approximate maximum regret at a 
specified sample size by the maximum entry across the relevant column cells of the table. 
 Table 3A has many interesting features. Observe that the maximum regret of the AMMR rule does not 
vary with p. Moreover, for each value of p, maximum regret rises rather than falls with sample size N, 
increasing from about 0.34 at N = 25 to 0.40 at N = 100. Part of the explanation for both features is that 
sampling variation makes the rule more randomized for small N and less so for large N. In the polar case 
N = 1, the AMMR rule coincides with the randomized singleton rule zN, which has maximum regret ¼ for 
all values of p.16 As N →  ∞, the AMMR rule approaches the MMR deterministic singleton rule, which has 
maximum regret ½ for all values of p.17 
 Table 3B constrains the state space to bound the difference between realized and counterfactual 
outcomes distributions. This mitigates the identification problem. The restriction reduces maximum regret 
moderately when p = 0.5, but only negligibly when p = 0.9. 
 Tables 4A and 4B consider the ES rule. Section 5.2.2 considered this rule when the distribution of 
realized outcomes is known. It was shown that, depending on this distribution, maximum regret equals zMMR 
or 1 − zMMR. Holding p fixed, maximum regret across all values of E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] is 
max (p, 1 – p). Table 4A shows that this is also maximum regret for the finite-sample version of the ES 
 
15 To create a simulated sample, the program draws N observations {δi, i = 1, . . . , N} from distribution Ps[δ(b) = 1]. 
Let K = ∑ i δi. It draws K observations {yi, i = 1, . . , K} from Ps[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] and N – K from Ps[y(a)|δ(a) = 1]. It is 
possible that K = 0 or N, so the specified treatment rules must be defined for these cases. The program uses the  
simulated realizations of (δ, y) to compute a simulated treatment choice. For a specified positive integer T, the program 
repeats the above T times and uses the T simulated treatment choices to approximate regret in state s. 
16 When N = 1, zN can only take the value 0 or 1. Hence,  zN = 1[zN > ½]. It was found above that, for any value of N, 
the maximum regret of zN given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes is zMMR(1 − zMMR). Maximum 
regret across all {p, E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]} is ¼, which occurs when zMMR = ½. This occurs for every p 
when E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] = E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = ½. 
 
17 It was found above that, given knowledge of the distribution of realized outcomes, the maximum regret of the MMR 
deterministic singleton rule is min (zMMR, 1 − zMMR). Maximum regret across all {p, E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]} 
is ½, which occurs when zMMR = ½. This occurs for every p when E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] = E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = ½. 
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rule.18 Table 4B shows that restricting the state space to bound the difference between realized and 
counterfactual distributions reduces maximum regret. The findings are somewhat subtle due to the small-
sample effect of constraining the state space, with different behavior for p = 0.5 and 0.6 than for p ≥ 0.7. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 To reiterate the central theme of this paper, use of statistical decision theory to evaluate econometric 
models is conceptually coherent and simple. A planner specifies a state space listing all the states of nature 
deemed feasible. One evaluates the performance of an SDF by the state-dependent vector of expected 
welfare that it yields. Decisions using models are evaluated in this manner. One evaluates model-based 
SDFs by their performance across the state space, not across the model space. 
 The primary challenge to use of statistical decision theory is computational. Recall that, in his 
discussion sketching application of statistical decision theory to prediction, Haavelmo (1944) remarked that 
such application (p. 111): “although simple in principle, will in general involve considerable mathematical 
problems and heavy algebra.” Many mathematical operations that were infeasible in 1944 are tractable now, 
as a result of advances in analytical and numerical methods. Hence, it has increasingly become possible to 
use statistical decision theory when performing econometric research that aims to inform decision making. 
Future advances should continue to expand the scope of applications. 
  
 
18 The ES rule does not benefit in small samples from the randomizing effect of random sampling because the states 
yielding maximum regret are polar ones where E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] equal 0 or 1. Holding p fixed, the 
supremum of regret across {E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1]} such that E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] > E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] is p when 
p > ½ and 1 – p when p < ½. The former occurs when E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] = 1 and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] → 1 and the latter 
when E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = 0 and E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] → 0. The supremum of regret across {E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1], E[y(b)|δ(b) = 
1]} such that E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] > E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] is again p when p > ½ and 1 – p when p < ½. The former occurs when 
E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] = 0 and E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] → 0 and the latter when E[y(b)|δ(b) = 1] = 1 and E[y(a)|δ(a) = 1] → 1. 
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Table 1A: Maximum MSE of Midpoint Predictor 
Unrestricted Outcome Distributions 
 
N P(δ = 1) 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
25 0.1963 0.1567 0.1219 0.0917 0.0658 0.0451 0.0292 0.0184 0.0120 0.0105 
50 0.1956 0.1554 0.1200 0.0891 0.0632 0.0422 0.0258 0.0140 0.0072 0.0052 
75 0.1953 0.1552 0.1196 0.0887 0.0624 0.0409 0.0243 0.0125 0.0055 0.0034 
100 0.1952 0.1548 0.1191 0.0881 0.0620 0.0404 0.0237 0.0119 0.0048 0.0025 
 
Table 1B: Maximum MSE of Midpoint Predictor 
−½ ≤ P(y = 1|δ = 1) − P(y = 1|δ = 0) ≤ ½ 
 
N P(δ = 1) 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
25 0.1962 0.1567 0.1214 0.0912 0.0658 0.0451 0.0292 0.0184 0.0120 0.0105 
50 0.1956 0.1553 0.1199 0.0890 0.0631 0.0422 0.0258 0.0140 0.0072 0.0052 
75 0.1952 0.1552 0.1192 0.0885 0.0622 0.0408 0.0242 0.0125 0.0055 0.0034 
100 0.1951 0.1548 0.1189 0.0881 0.0620 0.0402 0.0237 0.0119 0.0048 0.0025 
 
Table 2A: Maximum MSE of Prediction with Average Observed Outcome 
Unrestricted Outcome Distributions 
 
N P(δ = 1) 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
25 0.7409 0.6150 0.4716 0.3465 0.2407 0.1543 0.0870 0.0389 0.0148 0.0105 
50 0.7782 0.6166 0.4714 0.3464 0.2408 0.1542 0.0869 0.0387 0.0102 0.0052 
75 0.7793 0.6159 0.4713 0.3463 0.2406 0.1541 0.0868 0.0387 0.0098 0.0034 
100 0.7779 0.6151 0.4710 0.3462 0.2404 0.1541 0.0868 0.0387 0.0098 0.0025 
 
Table 2B: Maximum MSE of Prediction with Average Observed Outcomes 
−½ ≤ P(y = 1|δ = 1) − P(y = 1|δ = 0) ≤ ½ 
 
N P(δ = 1) 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
25 0.3189 0.2230 0.1599 0.1172 0.0836 0.0576 0.0375 0.0231 0.0143 0.0105 
50 0.2654 0.1875 0.1411 0.1033 0.0732 0.0486 0.0298 0.0165 0.0082 0.0052 
75 0.2406 0.1773 0.1345 0.0987 0.0693 0.0457 0.0273 0.0141 0.0063 0.0034 
100 0.2278 0.1719 0.1303 0.0957 0.0673 0.0442 0.0261 0.0132 0.0054 0.0025 
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Table 3A: Maximum Regret of the AMMR Rule 
Unrestricted Outcome Distributions 
 
N p 
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
25 0.3416 0.3441 0.3421 0.3428 0.3469 
50 0.3747 0.3782 0.3773 0.3792 0.3777 
75 0.3903 0.3887 0.3899 0.3892 0.3899 
100 0.4023 0.4021 0.4011 0.4026 0.4022 
 
Table 3B: Maximum Regret of the AMMR Rule 
−½ ≤ P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 1] – P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 0] ≤ ½, t ∊ {a, b} 
 
N p 
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
25 0.2772 0.2905 0.3041 0.3178 0.3313 
50 0.3126 0.3290 0.3421 0.3534 0.3646 
75 0.3277 0.3397 0.3523 0.3648 0.3774 
100 0.3402 0.3577 0.3713 0.3852 0.3927 
 
Table 4A: Maximum Regret of the ES Rule 
Unrestricted Outcome Distributions 
 
N p 
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
25 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.9000 
50 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.9000 
75 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.9000 
100 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.9000 
 
Table 4B: Maximum Regret of the ES Rule 
−½ ≤ P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 1] – P[y(t) = 1|δ(t) = 0] ≤ ½, t ∊ {a, b} 
 
N p 
 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
25 0.2791 0.3000 0.3500 0.4000 0.4500 
50 0.3086 0.3075 0.3500 0.4000 0.4500 
75 0.3280 0.3243 0.3500 0.4000 0.4500 
100 0.3381 0.3375 0.3500 0.4000 0.4500 
 
